The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany by Roesel, Felix
 
 








CEPIE Working Paper No. 02/17 





THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL 
SUPERVISION AND BUDGET DEFICITS: 









Editors: Faculty of Business and Economics, Technische Universität Dresden. 
This paper is published on the Open Access Repository Qucosa. 
The complete Working Paper Series can be found at the CEPIE Homepage. 
The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and
Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany
Felix Roesel†
ifo Institute, Dresden Branch
January 2017
Accepted for publication in Fiscal Studies
Abstract
In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal
supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate to which extent party align-
ment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The dataset
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not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co-partisanship)
drive short-term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments
and supervisors matters: left-wing local governments run higher deficits than their
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I. Introduction 
The bankruptcies of the U.S. cities of Stockton, San Bernardino and Detroit put the issue of excessive 
local government debt into the spotlight. Although studies have investigated different sources of local 
indebtedness, such as political business cycles [Ashworth et al. (2005), Veiga and Veiga (2007), Cioffi 
et al. (2012), Benito et al. (2015)], missing direct democratic institutions [Feld and Kirchgässner (2001)] 
or spatial dependency [Borck et al. (2015)], they do not reflect one of the main features of local finance: 
fiscal supervision. In most federal countries such as Austria, Australia, Canada and Germany, but also 
in some Swiss cantons and in a growing number of U.S. states, state authorities regulate local finance 
by drawing on a large set of mandatory approvals, reporting rules and intervention rights [Rattsø (2002)]. 
Local governments should, in principle, not run excessive deficits if their actions are subject to effective 
supervision. Christofzik and Kessing (2014) show that budget deficits are lower when local governments 
are subject to tight fiscal supervision. In practice, however, interactions between supervisors and gov-
ernments establish new sources of distortions and misdirected incentives if both levels are affiliated with 
political parties.1  
I present empirical evidence from German local governments supporting concerns of a political bias in 
fiscal supervision. A far-reaching institutional reform in the largest federal state of Germany, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, removed former accountabilities and introduced the direct election of both the lead-
ers of local governments and of their fiscal supervisors. At the same time, short-term debt (Kassenkred-
ite), which is at the discretion of governments and supervisors, began to rise sharply as shown in Figure 
1. The black line shows the evolution of local government short-term debt per capita since 1960. Short-
term debt did not play a role in local finance until the 1990s, it increased moderately beginning in 1994, 
and it has risen dramatically since the 1999 reform. This contrasts with the slowly declining long-term 
debt between 1999 and 2010 (gray line) which is related to capital spending. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                     
1 The question whether to install an independent or a partisan fiscal supervisor does also apply to higher levels of 
government, and even supranational institutions. Observers claim that a “strong, independent, non-partisan [EU] 
Commission is badly needed” and doubt whether a partisan president of the EU Commission will monitor the 
fiscal performance of EU member states unbiased [Grabbe and Lehne (2013)]. 
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Due to the overall high level of fiscal distress of German municipalities, The Economist (2011) labels 
them “Hundreds of mini-Greeces” and mentions the failure of “state watchdogs” as one of the main 
causes, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia. The political economy of fiscal supervision of German 
local governments is delicate. First, both supervised politicians and their fiscal supervisors are part of 
local party politics. Second, fiscal supervisors have a great deal of discretion in regulating local govern-
ments’ finance. Two political economy sources of supervisory failure may arise from this setting: party 
relations and party values. On the one hand, a partisan overseer may supervise a co-partisan government 
in a laxer fashion than a non-affiliated government. On the other hand, partisan supervisors may enforce 
their party values, leading to an ideological bias in fiscal supervision. I test both hypotheses empirically. 
Results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co-partisanship) drive short-
term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left-wing 
local governments run higher deficits than their right-wing counterparts; left-wing supervisors tolerate 
higher deficits than right-wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal 
supervisors is recommended. 
II. Related literature and hypotheses 
Central governments run fiscal policy autonomously, whereas local government finance is monitored 
and regulated by state authorities in many countries. Fiscal supervision includes mandatory approvals, 
reporting rules and intervention rights [Rattsø (2002)]. In some states, supervisors have to approve or 
can veto decisions on local budgets. In this case, the decision on local deficits is shared among two 
layers of government. If the decision on deficits is divided, both layers of government might be subject 
to partisan influences. Numerous studies show that ideology and party politics are main drivers of fiscal 
deficits [for an overview see Eslava (2011)]. In this section, I outline a political economy theory of 
partisanship and fiscal policy. In a second step, I discuss how partisanship impacts public finance within 
a setting of local governments and fiscal supervisors. 
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1. Partisanship and budget deficits 
Numerous empirical studies investigated partisan impacts on policy outcomes [seminally Hibbs (1977); 
for an overview, see Schmidt (1996)]. Papers show that left-wing parties favor a larger public sector and 
therefore higher governmental expenditures than their right-wing counterparts [e.g., Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2003), Potrafke (2010a), Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2013)]. However, the implications of this finding for 
fiscal deficits must be derived carefully. Higher spending levels do not necessarily corresponds with 
higher deficits when taxes are increased simultaneously. Conversely, tax cuts do not cause an increase 
in debt if they are combined with reductions in spending. Deficits only arise if either revenues or ex-
penditures are “fixed” for certain reasons. Party attitudes towards the extent of the public sector are such 
reasons: Higher deficits occur under right-wing governments if these governments enforce ideologically 
driven tax cuts, but the expenditure level is entirely determined by law or political opportunity. Con-
versely, if revenues are given, left-wing parties can only finance additional expenditures by increasing 
deficits.2 This leads to Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Partisanship matters to local government: Left-wing governments run higher deficits than 
right-wing governments when they face fixed revenues. 
Evidence from the sub-national level gives confidence to the theory outlined above. German state gov-
ernments face a strong asymmetry in fiscal autonomy, as they can spend and borrow autonomously but 
do not have significant authority to levy or raise taxes. As mentioned by theory, Wagschal (1996), Rod-
den (2006) and Potrafke et al. (2016) reveal higher deficits for left-wing state governments in Germany.3 
                                                     
2 For example, one may think of the Proposition 13 Tax Reform in California that was implemented in 1978, which 
limits the property tax rate by constitutional amendment [see Coupal (2004)]. In this view, the strategically multi-
period distribution of deficits under an intertemporal budget constraint is a sub-case of the theory I outlined. 
Persson and Svensson (1989) predict higher deficits of (“stubborn”) right-wing governments that face a replace-
ment by the political opponent. If these right-wing governments want to enforce a smaller public sector through 
lower public expenditures, they may cut taxes and borrow strategically to restrict future governments. Implicitly, 
this assumes fixed revenues. Conversely, Carlsen (1997) assumes higher deficits of left-wing governments because 
of asymmetrical reactions to the business cycle under left-wing leadership. While right-wing governments set a 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy and therefore avoid deficits in all circumstances, left-wing governments run counter-
cyclical deficits in times of recession but do not run surpluses in good times. Interestingly, this theory of inter-
temporal budget constraints also assumes a fixed level of revenues and/or spending. 
3 Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2011) and Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014) however do not find partisan effects at 
the German state level. 
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For the local level, evidence is mixed. García-Sánchez et al. (2011) show that Spanish towns run higher 
debt levels under left-wing governments than under right-wing governments. Conversely, Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001) presents evidence of higher deficits of right-wing governments in Swedish municipali-
ties. Other micro-econometric studies do not find partisan sources of local deficits. Neither Ashworth et 
al. (2005), Veiga and Veiga (2007), nor Letelier (2011) reveal a significant influence of partisanship on 
Belgian, Portuguese and Chilean municipal deficits. An explanation for these results might be that stud-
ies on local governments do not address the issue of revenue or expenditure constraints. This paper 
address this issue and presents evidence on German municipalities that face a de facto given level of 
revenues (see Section III for more detail). 
2. Partisanship and fiscal supervision 
Most federal states have to resolve the trade-off between local autonomy on the one hand and implicit 
or explicit bailout guarantees of higher levels of government on the other hand [Rodden (2006)]. States 
therefore installed mechanisms of fiscal supervision to prevent lower levels from adverse actions and to 
avoid bailout payments.4 In Austria, Australia, Canada and Germany, for example, state authorities reg-
ulate local governments’ finances by drawing on a large set of intervention rights. Even in Switzerland 
that virtually abandons local government bailouts, cantons supervise the fiscal policy of their munici-
palities. Recently, a growing number of U.S. states experiment with more active and hands-on fiscal 
supervision of local governments in reaction to an increasing level of municipal fiscal distress [Spiotto 
(2013)].  
One aspect that is frequently overlooked is that supervision induces new sources of misdirected incen-
tives if fiscal supervisors are part of local politics, e.g., in Germany or Austria. First, co-partisanship 
between a supervisor and a government that belongs to the same party may have an influence on fiscal 
policy [Letelier (2011)]. Partisans in lower levels of government can use party connections to enjoy the 
laxer debt supervision of aligned fiscal supervisors, e.g., by threatening to not re-nominate a co-partisan 
supervisor for office [Khemani (2007a)]. Bailout expectations may also increase deficits under co-par-
tisanship [Rodden (2006)]. As a state bailout seems to be more likely if a co-partisan runs the state 
                                                     
4 For country studies, see Rattsø (2002), Rodden et al. (2003), Steytler (2005). 
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government, this expectation may result in less fiscal discipline. Hypothesis 2 captures these consider-
ations:5 
Hypothesis 2: Co-partisanship matters to fiscal supervision: Governments, of any party, run higher def-
icits under a co-partisan supervisor than under a non-aligned supervisor. 
Second, a partisan supervisor may reinforce her ideological values towards budget deficits inde-
pendently of whether the supervised government belongs to the same party. Khemani (2007a), p. 56 
illustrates this for the case of Indian states: “If there is any impact of political partisanship, then co-
partisan states should have lower deficits if the party’s political incentives are aligned with greater fiscal 
discipline. However, if the party’s own interests are served through greater deficits, then co-partisan 
states should have higher deficits.” The incentives to use supervisory powers to enforce party values are 
even larger when electoral externalities link different layers of governments [Rodden (2006)]. These 
externalities arise if the re-election probability of a politician is not only driven by her own reputation 
but also by the reputation of her co-partisan counterpart at another level of government. In this case, 
fiscal supervisors are confronted with even stronger incentives to take coherent supervisory actions re-
lated to their partisan values (Hypothesis 3). 
Hypothesis 3: Partisanship matters to fiscal supervision: Governments, of any party, run higher deficits 
under a left-wing supervisor than under a right-wing supervisor when local governments face fixed rev-
enues. 
To date, little is known about the effects of fiscal supervision on local finance.6 Few studies focus on 
the relationship between the central and the first sub-national government level. Rodden (2006) and 
                                                     
5 Jones et al. (2000) and Cioffi et al. (2012) describe a different perspective. Under strong “top-down” party dis-
cipline, national party leaders might be able to put pressure on affiliated sub-national governments to stop unsus-
tainable fiscal policy. Co-partisanship would then lead to sounder fiscal outcomes. However, as the “bottom-up” 
setting of internal party powers as proposed by Khemani (2007a) appears more plausible for western democracies, 
I follow the deficit-enforcing theory of co-partisanship. 
6 By contrast, transfers of state governments to affiliated local governments are well-documented [Larcinese et al. 
(2006), Khemani (2007c), Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008)]. 
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Khemani (2007a, 2007b) show a deficit-raising effect of co-partisanship between central and state gov-
ernments in Germany and India, respectively. For the case of Brazilian states and Italian regions, Rodden 
(2006) and Hallerberg and Stolfi (2008) do not find a significant influence of co-partisanship. Hence, 
evidence of an impact of co-partisanship on fiscal policy (Hypothesis 2) at the state level is at least 
mixed. Surprisingly, previous studies have not investigated the local level, albeit the political, institu-
tional and especially supervisory links between local and state governments are much tighter than be-
tween state and central governments. Anecdotally, fiscal supervision has been described to be one of the 
key determinants of local finance [Dollery et al. (2009), Holler (2012)]. As a single exception, Chris-
tofzik and Kessing (2014) document lower local deficits when fiscal supervision is tight. The political 
economy interactions of supervisees and supervisors, however, have not been addressed so far. This 
paper aims to fill this research gap by drawing on data of German local governments and their supervi-
sors. As shown below, the chosen framework allows the testing of Hypothesis 1 as well as the competing 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
III. Institutional background 
1. Local government in Germany 
Germany has a federal system with a central government, state governments and two layers of local 
government (municipalities, counties). Municipalities (Gemeinden) are responsible for local public ser-
vices such as public order, waste disposal or cultural institutions and can set their own tax rates on 
property and local business. Counties (Landkreise) constitute the second local government layer and 
roughly correspond with US counties in terms of population. Counties are mainly responsible for social 
care (youth and social welfare, accommodation costs of long-term unemployed), public transport, public 
health, and parts of education. 
I focus on the largest German state in terms of population, North Rhine-Westphalia, to rule out noise 
from institutional differences between German states. In North Rhine-Westphalia, there are 427 local 
governments in total (396 municipalities, and 31 counties which group 7 to 24 municipalities).7 Since 
                                                     
7 23 large urban municipalities (Kreisfreie Städte) execute both municipality’s and county’s powers as one. 
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1999, political powers within local governments in North Rhine-Westphalia are divided between a di-
rectly elected head of government (municipalities: mayor, counties: county administrator) on the one 
hand and a local council on the other hand. A proportional system is implemented for local council 
elections. Usually, the head of government is a member of a political party and holds powerful rights, 
especially assuming the day-to-day management of local administrations. The local council decides on 
more general issues, e.g., local statutes. Mayors, county administrators and local councils are elected for 
five years in elections held on the same day statewide. 
Local governments in North Rhine-Westphalia are in high fiscal distress. North Rhine-Westphalia co-
vers approximately 22% of the German population (2010), but 36% of local governments’ total debt 
(44.5 billion Euro) and 48% of local governments’ short-term debt (18.8 billion Euro) [Federal Statisti-
cal Office (2013a)]. Moreover, local governments in North Rhine-Westphalia run the highest property 
and business tax rates on average in Germany, while state-funded grants have been declining for years 
[Federal Statistical Office (2013b), Agency of Information and Technology of North Rhine-Westphalia 
(2014)]. Given a vital business tax competition between German municipalities [Buettner (2001)], local 
governments in North Rhine-Westphalia can no longer raise taxes on a large scale. Industrial represent-
atives expressed their deep worries that North Rhine-Westphalia is falling behind in attracting busi-
nesses because of high business tax rates and call for tax cuts [IHK Cologne (2009)]. Altogether, local 
governments in North Rhine-Westphalia face a de facto constraint on revenues that may allow partisan 
differences to come into action. 
2. Fiscal supervision of local government debt 
In Germany, and also in North Rhine-Westphalia, local governments can spend and borrow autono-
mously but are subject to fiscal supervision. All federal states have implemented a broad set of budget 
oversight instruments to monitor their local governments (Kommunalaufsicht). The fiscal supervisor has 
the right to request information on local affairs, approve decisions on specific topics and suspend illegal 
decisions made by the local council or the government. In more extreme cases, the fiscal supervisor can 
substitute local governments’ decisions, dissolve the local council or appoint a regulator to take over 
local decisions. Notably, all of these regulation steps are entirely at the discretion of the supervisor. The 
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instruments and the intervention powers of fiscal supervisors differ substantially between German states. 
In some states, the local budget has to be approved by the supervisor; other states only receive the local 
budget for information [for overviews, see Brüning and Vogelgesang (2009), Glöckner and Mühlen-
kamp (2009), Holler (2012)].  
In North Rhine-Westphalia, municipalities are supervised by the county administrators who act on be-
half of the state government in exercising fiscal supervision. Counties in turn are directly supervised by 
the state administration.  Fiscal supervision includes the monitoring of long-term and short-term debt. 
Long-term debt is solely allowed to finance capital spending given a sound fiscal perspective, and has 
to be passed by the local council. The fiscal supervisor can veto the budget within one month.8 Short-
term debt is treated differently. The head of the local government decides on short-term debt in order to 
ensure the liquidity of the local authority. The local council cannot intervene in specific short-term debt 
decisions of the government.9 The sharp increase in short-term debt in recent years (see Figure 1) how-
ever cannot be explained by liquidity purposes only. Legal literature deems the evolution of short-term 
debt to be obviously illegal [Heinemann et al. (2009)]. The fiscal supervisors would have the right to 
restrict local governments’ short-term debt, but the exercise of this right is at their discretion.  
The institutional setting provides a fatal opportunity for both strategic “buddy” deals between the su-
pervised government and the fiscal supervisor and for ideological supervision. On the one hand, munic-
ipal party sections decide whether to re-nominate the fiscal supervisor (county administrator) running 
for office again.10 Municipal party sections are often led by the mayor whose actions are subject to the 
supervision of the county administrator. To ensure her re-nomination, a partisan supervisor might be 
vulnerable to pressure and slackens supervision of municipalities. Second, supervised municipal politi-
cians are often members of the county council that monitors the actions of the county administrator (i.e., 
the fiscal supervisor of municipalities) and enacts the county’s budget. This provides further opportuni-
ties to put pressure on the fiscal supervisor. Heinemann et al. (2009), p. 185 report on the “specific risk 
                                                     
8 In other German states, the budget not only has to be notified but also has to be approved by the supervisor. 
9 The council can only set out a general short-term debt ceiling. Usually, this ceiling is generously sized and will 
be raised in times of fiscal distress. 
10 There are no term limits. Politicians are allowed to compete for re-election. 
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of politically motivated collusion or coercion situations, e.g., between the county administrator and the 
mayor of the supervised municipality” (own translation by the author). Left-wing mayors, in particular, 
are said to use party connections to exert pressure on fiscal supervisors [Holtkamp (2000)]. 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that supports the ideology hypothesis for fiscal supervisors. 
Glöckner and Mühlenkamp (2009), p. 415 suspect a “partisan-driven political logic of action by the 
supervisory authority” (translation by the author) in German states. In North Rhine-Westphalia, electoral 
externalities are important, because one observes a sharp polarization and tight races between right-wing 
and left-wing parties. Thus, partisan supervisors should take coherent policy actions according to their 
parties’ values. An ideological behavior of supervisors is therefore as likely as a co-partisan favoritism. 
Ultimately, this is an empirical matter. 
IV. Empirical strategy 
1. Identification 
Reverse causality concerns are some of the most common issues of empirical political economy models 
[see Eslava (2011)]. On the one hand, numerous studies on political business cycles show that politicians 
borrow in order to ensure re-election (see, e.g., Potrafke 2010b). On the other hand, empirical evidence 
shows that excessive budget deficits reduce the probability of governments to be re-elected [Brender 
and Drazen (2008)]. Thus, partisanship may impact fiscal outcomes, but also vice versa. Reverse cau-
sality of deficits and electoral outcomes becomes even more complicated in the case of vertical co-
partisanship. Because of electoral externalities between different layers of government in a federal sys-
tem, fiscal outcomes and electoral results of multiple layers of government are no longer independent. 
The exceptional evolution of local government institutions in North Rhine-Westphalia gives a simple 
but efficacious opportunity to address these concerns to considerable extent. A far-reaching institutional 
reform entirely re-distributed the political powers at both layers of local government (municipalities and 
counties). Until 1999, local government leadership was divided. At the municipal level, mayors worked 
in an honorary capacity and carried out mainly representative tasks, while a city manager as the chief of 
the local administration executed the operative management of the municipality. Both leading officials 
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were elected by the local council. In 1999, this parliamentary system was replaced by a presidential 
system: the functions of the city manager and mayor were conjoined, and direct elections were intro-
duced. The county level was treated analogously: the former functions of an honorary county adminis-
trator and an operating county manager were merged into one. Since 1999, a directly elected county 
administrator supervises the municipalities. Hence, former accountabilities of both government and su-
pervision have vanished. This is especially true for the case of short-term debt because the function held 
responsible for short-term debt (city managers) and its supervision (county managers) no longer exist. I 
therefore assume that the electoral chances of the candidates running for the newly created mayors’ 
offices in 1999 cannot be driven by their own previous local budget performance.11 There have not been 
further local elections between 1999 and 2004. Thus, reverse causality can be ruled out to substantial 
extent which reduces a potential bias in OLS estimates. For robustness exercises, I will later investigate 
an extended period up to the year 2010.12 However, long-run results have to be interpreted in a prudent 
way due to more serious reverse causality concerns.13 
2. Data 
The dataset includes all 427 local governments (396 municipalities, 31 counties) of North Rhine-West-
phalia for the first period of direct local elections from 2000 to 2004 (2,135 observations). Financial and 
socio-demographic data are provided by the Agency of Information and Technology of North Rhine-
Westphalia (2013, 2014) and the Federal Employment Agency (2013); data on local election outcomes 
and officeholders are taken from the Ministry of the Interior of North Rhine-Westphalia (2014), and 
some are hand-collected. Financial data were deflated by a uniform GDP deflator for North Rhine-
Westphalia to generate data in 2012 prices [Regional Accounts VGRdL (2014)]. 
                                                     
11 Some of the mayoral candidates in 1999 had previously been a part of local politics as members of the local 
council or had served as honorary mayors. However, they could not influence short-term deficits in these positions. 
Only 27.3% of all elected mayors in 1999 previously served as city managers and may have issued short-term 
debt. Moreover, one out of four of these mayors has not been affiliated with a political party [Gehne (2000)]. In 
addition, the reform of the electoral system and of the competences of the local politicians in 1999 has been that 
massive, that former short-term debt performance should not have an impact on the first election outcomes. 
12 Because of significant reforms I restricted the data set to the period up to 2010: In 2011, an extensive bailout 
package for municipalities in fiscal distress has been implemented by the state government (Stärkungspakt Stadt-
finanzen). In addition, the supervision on these municipalities has switched over from the county administrator to 
the state administration.  
13 Outcomes of the second direct election of the head of government in 2004 might have been driven by fiscal 
policy of the first generation of directly elected governments. 
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Short-term (long-term) deficits are measured as the absolute annual change of short-term (long-term) 
debt per capita. Financial data include deficits of the core budget of local governments; deficits of extra 
budgets are not covered.14 For robustness exercises, I also use the short-term loan finance quotient (ratio 
of short-term deficit and total spending) as an alternative measure of annual budget deficits. The main 
variables of interest, the measures of being a left-wing or a right-wing head of local government and 
being subject to a left-wing or right-wing supervision,15 are coded binary because of a clear left-right 
classification of the parties in office.16 Hence, I can compute a co-partisanship dummy that is equal to 1 
if the local government and its supervisor belong to the same ideology (either right-wing or left-wing) 
and do not face problems related to measuring the degree of alignment between different government 
layers [Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), Letelier (2011)]. 
3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. For reasons of stationarity, I use deficits (absolute changes in 
debt stocks) rather than the debt stocks shown in Figure 1 above. On average, short-term deficits 
amounted to 25 Euro in real terms per capita per year, while long-term deficits were at 4 Euro per capita 
on average. In most cases, local governments in North Rhine-Westphalia have been led by right-wing 
parties (68%). Left-wing governments account for 20%, non-partisan governments for 12% of all cases. 
In 64% of all observations, the head of the local government and the fiscal supervisor belong to the same 
party (co-partisanship). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Beside partisan issues, socio-demographics may drive local deficits. I use several variables which I also 
include in first differences to ensure stationarity. First, in cases of high unemployment rates, local gov-
ernments have to bear additional social expenditures. I include the number of unemployed per 1,000 
                                                     
14 This data restriction should not change the results for short-term debt substantially because core budget short-
term debt accounts for more than 99% of total local government short-term debt in North Rhine-Westphalia [Fed-
eral Statistical Office (2013a)]. 
15 There have been no non-partisan supervisors. 
16 The conservative CDU and the liberal FDP are treated as “right-wing”, the social democratic SPD and the Green 
Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) are treated as “left-wing” parties. In addition, there are also non-partisan govern-
ments. The partisan variable of the head of government is coded by a certain party if this party was in office for 
the whole year. In cases of leadership changes during the year, deficits are treated to be still determined by her 
predecessor to ensure a correct accountability for the annual deficit. 
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capita as a proxy for local labor market problems.17 Second, larger municipalities are said to run higher 
expenditures per capita than smaller municipalities, e.g., because of rising crowding costs [Wildasin 
(1986)]. To control for this additional source of deficits, I include the population size. Third, declining 
intergovernmental grants from higher levels of government may force local governments to borrow 
more if other sources of revenues are depleted. Therefore, the estimations include the received intergov-
ernmental grants from the state government (Schlüsselzuweisungen). The first difference of the area 
covered by buildings captures the increase of local wealth, (property) tax base and the popularity of a 
certain municipality. Fifth, the far-reaching structural change in the densely populated Ruhr district has 
not yet been completed. Supporting the shift of the local economy from coal and other heavy industries 
to services may cause additional local government spending and deficits. I use the share of industrial 
employees as a proxy for this specific economic condition. Spillover effects may force local govern-
ments to run deficits. For instance, in-commuters cause additional public expenditures but do only par-
tially contribute to local governments’ revenues because the income tax has to be paid at the place of 
residence. The share of in-commuters of all employees that have their workplace in the local government 
covers this potential deficit-forcing channel. Lastly, dummies related to the locally dominating religious 
denomination cover deep-rooted cultural aspects which may influence local fiscal behavior. 
I include variables that account for further political economy theories. First, following the weak govern-
ment hypothesis, one may expect a deficit-increasing effect of a fragmented council [Roubini and Sachs 
(1989)]. Therefore, I add a dummy that equals 1 if neither right-wing nor left-wing parties hold an ab-
solute majority in the local council (fragmented council) and 0 otherwise. Second, I include a dummy 
variable that measures whether the party of the head of government holds an absolute majority in the 
local council. This was true in about 68% of all cases between 2000 and 2004 (see Table 1). The impact 
of this variable is not clear: if the government can rely on a majority in the council, it might be easier to 
enact fiscal consolidation and deficit reductions. At the same time, the system of checks and balances 
among the executive and legislative branch of local government is weak, and deficits may increase. 
                                                     
17 At the municipal level, the common unemployment rate is not available. 
  13 
4. Regression design 
As the baseline specification, I estimate a Pooled OLS model with standard errors clustered at the local 
government level and year fixed effects. Like many other studies which investigate cross-sectional dif-
ferences in municipal debt, the setting of this paper is characterized by low time variation in main ex-
planatory variables of interest. Cabasés et al. (2007) employ Pooled OLS, and Letelier (2011) uses a 
Random Effects framework to study the influence of institutions on local government debt. Due to the 
empirical setup, both studies cannot include local government fixed effects. 
However, this strategy might be associated with a potential omitted variable bias. This paper tackles the 
possibility of an omitted variable bias in three ways. First, reverse causality can be ruled out to large 
extent because of the 1999 electoral reform discussed above. Second, I include a broad set of control 
variables ranging from labor market conditions, demographic measures even to local religious denomi-
nation. Given that religious denomination is associated with deep-rooted local culture it may cover debt 
attitude as well as political preferences [Dyson (2014)]. Third, I include district fixed effects. In North 
Rhine-Westphalia, five districts (Regierungsbezirke) exist which highly coincide with cultural borders 
[see, e.g., Neuhaus et al. (2004)]. This allows me to control for common time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics of municipalities within the same district.  
The estimation equation is specified as follows: 
 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑅𝑖 + 𝛿𝑌𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (1) 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 measures the short-term deficit per capita of local government 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The regression includes a 
set of 𝑘 control variables (𝑋), year fixed effects (𝑌), district fixed effects (𝑅), and local government type 
fixed effects (𝑇) which equals 1 for counties and 0 for municipalities. Due to stationary concerns, all 
socio-demographic and fiscal controls are measured in first differences, although results do not change 
substantially when the regressions are estimated in levels. To separate partisan and co-partisan effects, 
I use interaction terms. 𝐿𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if a government is affiliated with a left-wing party and 0 for a right-
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wing party.18 In the baseline setting, I exclude non-partisan governments. 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is equal to 1 in cases of 
co-partisanship (same party affiliation of governments and fiscal supervisors). The interaction term 
𝐿𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡 captures the case of left-wing co-partisanship. This set of dummies covers all possible cases of 
relationships between governments and supervisors and allows to test of the three guiding hypothesis 
introduces above (see Table 2). Right-wing governments under left-wing supervision represent the base 
category, while 𝛽1 measures the converse constellation. 𝛽2 gives the marginal effect for a right-wing 
co-partisan relationship; the sum of the coefficients 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 captures left-wing co-partisanship. 
[Table 2 about here] 
As introduced above, Hypothesis 1 states that left-wing governments run higher deficits than right-wing 
governments. If this case, each term of the first row in Table 2 (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 respectively 𝛽1) should 
be larger than its counterpart in the second row (zero and 𝛽2): 
 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 > 0 and 𝛽1 > 𝛽2 (2) 
Subtracting 𝛽2 from both sides of the second condition yields: 
 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 > 0 and 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 > 0 (3) 
If co-partisanship matters (Hypothesis 2), local governments’ deficits should be higher under co-parti-
sanship than under adversary supervision, independent of a left-right affiliation. Hence, coefficient 𝛽2 
should be greater than zero (right-wing co-partisanship), and the term 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 should be signifi-
cantly greater than 𝛽1 (left-wing co-partisanship). Because one can subtract 𝛽1 on both sides of the first 
condition, (4) shows the formalization of Hypothesis 2: 
 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 > 0 and 𝛽2 > 0 (4) 
Conversely, if political values dominate co-partisanship in supervision, an ideological supervisor force 
her political attitude on the issue of debt independently of the party of the government (Hypothesis 3). 
Formally, this leads to (5) that competes with (4): 
                                                     
18 In 1999, about 97% of all partisan politicians have been a member of their nominating party [data based on 
Gehne (2000)]. However, also the small amount of politicians who are not party members may show loyalty to 
their nominating party given the vital party competition in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
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 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 > 0 and 𝛽2 < 0 (5) 
The results for the question of partisan or co-partisan oversight policy are mainly driven by the sign of 
𝛽2 and 𝛽2 + 𝛽3. If the signs of these terms point in the same direction, the hypothesis of co-partisan 
favoritism can be confirmed. If there is a significant, but different sign, evidence of ideological super-
vision is found. 
V. Results 
1. Baseline results 
The results of the baseline specifications are shown in Table 3. Model 1 is the most parsimonious spec-
ification, Models 2 and 3 include local government type fixed effects, district fixed effects and additional 
variables. A positive sign indicates higher deficits and lower surpluses; a negative sign shows greater 
fiscal discipline. The coefficient for the interaction term (𝐿 × 𝐶), 𝛽3, is statistically significant and 
greater than zero at the 1% level in all specifications. Conversely, 𝛽2 is smaller than zero and also sig-
nificant at the 1% level. The coefficient for left-wing governments (𝛽1) also differs significantly from 
zero and is always greater than 𝛽2. The inclusion of additional controls does not change the signs and 
order of any coefficient of interest. I find a significant but very small substitution effect of short-term 
and long-term debt of about 6 Cent (Model 3). 
[Table 3 about here] 
However, as regression results of the interacted variables cannot be interpreted themselves, I calculated 
the marginal effects proposed in Table 2. Table 4 shows the results for the period from 2000 to 2004, 
calculated for Model 1 in Table 3. Partisanship matters to government as well as to supervision: While 
left-wing governments run higher short-term deficits than right-wing governments, governments under 
left-wing supervision run even higher deficits than under right-wing supervision. The marginal effect 
for left-wing co-partisanship remains insignificant due to a small number of observations. For a larger 
sample up to 2010, one observes a highly significant result. 
[Table 4 about here] 
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The results are in line with the theory on partisan behavior. As described above, local governments’ 
revenues in North Rhine-Westphalia are constrained by both an increasingly exhausted tax base and 
declining state transfers. Given that left-wing governments prefer higher expenditure levels, the only 
way to finance these additional expenditures is to run higher deficits (governments) or to tolerate higher 
deficits (supervisors). Altogether, Hypotheses 1 and 3 can be confirmed: Ideology matters and domi-
nates the incentives resulting from party connections. 
All partisan effects are substantial. Hypothetically, a left-wing government switching from a right-wing 
to a left-wing supervisor would increase the short-term deficit by 87 Euro per capita which is 85% of a 
standard deviation in the period from 2000 to 2004 (see Figure 2, left-hand side).19 This effect remains 
almost constant for the period from 2000 to 2010.20 Also a right-wing government facing a left-wing 
instead of a right-wing supervisor would run higher short-term deficits (34% to 39% of a standard de-
viation). Positive bars at the right-hand side of Figure 2 show that changing from a right-wing to a left-
wing government would lead to higher deficits, too. Interestingly, the effects of an ideological switch of 
the supervisor are about 20 to 30 percentage points larger than changes in government (compare left-
hand side bars to right-hand side bars in Figure 2). Empirical studies on local finance should therefore 
always address fiscal supervision rather than focusing on the local government level only. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
2. Robustness tests 
I carry out several robustness tests which are compared to the baseline results in Table 5 (column 1). 
First, differences between municipalities and counties may drive the results. Municipalities are super-
vised by county administrators whereas counties are directly supervised by the state administration. I 
exclude local governments of the county type to account for differences in supervision intensity between 
county administrators and state authorities (Model 2). The remaining more homogenous sample includes 
municipalities only. All partisan results hold under this specification. Second, if fiscal supervision is 
                                                     
19 Note that positive signs indicate a larger deficit. The standard deviation for the period from 2000 to 2004 is 
102.62 (see Table 1). The switch of a left-wing government from a left-wing to a right-wing supervisor would 
lower the short term deficit by 51.80 − (−35.63) =  87.43; this gives an effect of 87.43/102.62 = 85%. 
20 The calculation for the 2000 to 2010 period gives: (56.14 − (−30.53))/131.08 = 66%. Descriptive statistics 
for the 2000 to 2010 are available upon request. 
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driven by ideology, this bias should not only be visible in the case of partisan governments, but also in 
the case of non-partisan governments. All results are robust to the inclusion of non-partisan governments 
(Model 3). I conclude that results are not driven by governments which are not affiliated with a political 
party. Third, I test whether results depend on the baseline estimation strategy (Pooled OLS). I re-esti-
mated the baseline specification with Random Effects and Between Effects (Models 4 and 5). The re-
sults referring to these models are similar to the Pooled OLS model. Thus, results do not depend on a 
certain estimation technique. Fourth, all results hold in a long-term perspective. I extend the dataset to 
the year 2010 (Model 6). Inferences do not change albeit reverse causality might be a more serious issue 
in this specification. I conclude that results are not driven by a certain time period. Fifth, the measure-
ment of annual deficits might be an issue. The absolute deficit per capita does not account for the size 
of the local budget which might be higher for certain reasons, e.g., special local needs. I substitute annual 
short-term deficits per capita as the dependent variable by the loan finance quotient which measures the 
ratio of short-term deficits and total spending. The loan finance quotient, however, leads to the same 
signs of all coefficients (Model 7). Hence, findings are also robust to a different way of measuring 
budget deficits. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Finally, I exploit the asymmetric supervisory rules for long-term and short-term debt. As shown in Sec-
tion III, long-term debt is subject to strict rules, whereas short-term debt is at the discretion of govern-
ments and fiscal supervisors. Therefore, one should expect that (co-)partisanship matters to short-term 
deficits, but not to long-term deficits. Table 6 gives results of a pseudo treatment specification in which 
I substitute short-term deficits by long-term deficits (Models 3 and 4). As expected, partisanship does 
not have an effect on long-term deficits because the relevant transmission channel is missing. This test 
provides further evidence for the findings in the case of short-term debt. 
[Table 6 about here] 
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VI. Conclusion 
I investigated whether partisanship of governments and fiscal supervisors has an impact on local gov-
ernment budget deficits. I show that partisanship matters to both government and to fiscal supervision: 
Left-wing governments run higher short-term deficits than right-wing governments, and left-wing su-
pervisors tolerate higher deficits than their right-wing counterparts. Ideology even dominates the incen-
tives resulting from party connections between affiliated levels of government. 
These findings have important implications for the debate on the optimal design and extent of fiscal 
supervision. Following Khemani (2007a), Glöckner and Mühlenkamp (2009), Grabbe and Lehne (2013) 
or Spiotto (2013), one could advocate an independent supervisory agency or board in order to avoid 
partisan distortions. Two other German federal states, which also suffer from local fiscal distress, 
adopted reforms along this consideration. In 2008, Saarland shifted all supervisory powers to a central 
state agency. For municipalities in the state of Hesse, bailout payments from the state government come 
with direct supervision by the state administration. However, these reforms remain incomplete because 
the new supervisors are appointed by the state government and are not immune to partisan influences, 
either. 
An independent local government debt agency, however, suffers from a lack of democratic legitimacy. 
Strengthening the accountability for local decisions might be a more democratic way to limit local gov-
ernment debt. One step could be the implementation of quasi-automatic direct democratic decisions on 
local budgets [Feld and Kirchgässner (2001)]. Further research is needed for a better understanding of 
efficacious supervision regimes that solve the trade-off between independence and legitimacy. A sys-
tematic cross-national study on this important issue as recommended by Rattsø (2002) is still missing. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Local government short-term and long-term debt in North Rhine-Westphalia, 1960–2010 
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of a hypothetical switch from left-wing to right-wing supervision and left-
wing to right-wing government 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptives, 2000–2004 
 Obs. Mean Std. Der. Min. Max. 
Short-term deficit (Euro per capitaa) 2,135 24.88 102.62 -730.97 1,564.90 
Long-term deficit (Euro per capitaa) 2,135 4.76 133.63 -2,214.58 943.23 
Short-term loan finance quotient (%) 2,135 1.10 4.54 -32.27 47.28 
Long-term loan finance quotient (%) 2,135 0.25 6.48 -78.77 45.64 
Right-wing government 2,135 0.68 0.46 0 1 
Left-wing government 2,135 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Non-partisan government 2,135 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Co-partisanship 2,135 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Right-wing government  Co-partisanship 2,135 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Left-wing government  Co-partisanship 2,135 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Population (in 1,000 inhabitants) 2,135 67.20 118.00 4.26 969.71 
Old-age dependency ratio 2,135 0.44 0.05 0.26 0.73 
Unemployment (per 1,000 capita) 2,135 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.08 
State grants (Euro per capitaa) 2,135 197.11 121.10 -69.15 607.47 
Area covered by buildings (in % of total area) 2,135 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.46 
Share of industrial employees 2,135 0.28 0.16 0 0.72 
Share of in-commuters 2,135 0.54 0.13 0.15 0.83 
Catholic majority 2,135 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Fragmented council 2,135 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Affiliated council (Abs. majority of government partyb) 2,135 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Notes: a) Financial data in 2012 prices. b) Partisan majorities only. Data: Agency of Information and Technology 
of North Rhine-Westphalia (2013, 2014), Federal Employment Agency (2013), Ministry of the Interior of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (2014). 
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Left-wing 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝛽1 
Right-wing 0 𝛽2 
Notes: Coefficients refer to Equation 1. 
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Table 3: Baseline results (Pooled OLS) 
 
Short-term deficit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) 
Left-wing government (𝐿) -35.63** -64.06*** -61.20*** 
 (15.60) (20.52) (20.61) 
Co-partisanship (𝐶) -39.86*** -74.38*** -72.37*** 
 (14.99) (19.44) (19.51) 
Left-wing government  Co-partisanship (𝐿 × 𝐶) 127.30*** 149.81*** 144.21*** 
 (36.52) (42.81) (43.15) 
∆Population  -7.15* -7.99** 
  (3.99) (3.93) 
∆Old-age dependency ratio  -320.07 -322.22 
  (483.67) (480.71) 
∆Unemployment  -0.00** -0.00** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
∆State grants  -0.05 -0.05 
  (0.05) (0.04) 
∆Area covered by buildings  -907.66** -879.00** 
  (389.37) (393.66) 
∆Share of industrial employees  49.49 52.06 
  (95.95) (93.76) 
∆Share of in-commuters  6.48 20.31 
  (175.39) (171.18) 
Catholic majority  -3.05 -3.56 
  (9.21) (9.23) 
Fragmented council  -0.77 -0.13 
  (10.98) (10.86) 
Affiliated council  7.80 9.86 
  (15.77) (15.73) 
Long-term deficit per capita   -0.06** 
   (0.03) 
Constant 82.97*** 98.80*** 94.09*** 
 (16.71) (24.91) (24.87) 
Period 2000–2004 2000–2004 2000–2004 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES 
District fixed effects NO YES YES 
Local government type fixed effects NO YES YES 
Non-partisan governments included NO NO NO 
Counties included YES YES YES 
Obs. 1,880 1,880 1,880 
Adj. R² 0.07 0.13 0.14 
Akaike 22,715.06 22,621.50 22,609.92 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the local government level in parentheses. Significance levels: *: p<0.1; 
**: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01. 
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Notes: Standard errors clustered at the local government level in parentheses. Significance levels: *: p<0.1; **: 
p<0.05; ***: p<0.01. The calculated effects are based on Model 1 in Table 3. 
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Table 5: Robustness tests 
 
Short-term deficit per capita 
Short-term loan fi-








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Left-wing government (𝐿) -64.06*** -79.17*** -19.38** -63.29*** -68.92*** -46.34*** -2.06*** 
 (20.52) (25.36) (8.79) (16.32) (16.38) (14.38) (0.73) 
Co-partisanship (𝐶) -74.38*** -90.39*** -38.66*** -74.45*** -77.61*** -54.92*** -2.33*** 
 (19.44) (25.37) (10.76) (13.16) (13.20) (11.94) (0.66) 
Left-wing government  Co-partisanship (𝐿 × 𝐶) 149.81*** 169.46*** 95.98** 147.41*** 162.49*** 121.98*** 4.71*** 
 (42.81) (47.54) (38.83) (23.45) (23.64) (27.22) (1.34) 
∆Population -7.15* -16.13** -6.13 -2.56 -19.78*** -22.12*** -0.22 
 (3.99) (7.65) (3.89) (3.95) (5.52) (5.48) (0.14) 
∆Old-age dependency ratio -320.07 -427.24 -578.22 -245.62 -418.17 -363.89 1.33 
 (483.67) (493.77) (407.78) (495.80) (756.50) (482.96) (19.76) 
∆Unemployment -0.00** -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
∆State grants -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.24 -0.13*** -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.19) (0.03) (0.00) 
∆Area covered by buildings -907.66** -917.39** -433.45 -844.16** -1379.62 -400.86 -49.22** 
 (389.37) (390.35) (329.06) (407.79) (1096.82) (299.32) (23.70) 
∆Share of industrial employees 49.49 49.53 33.57 43.33 195.96 -45.96 2.14 
 (95.95) (95.57) (88.49) (60.98) (185.31) (40.26) (5.28) 
∆Share of in-commuters 6.48 6.02 55.62 70.52 -815.08 36.74 -4.20 
 (175.39) (180.83) (155.45) (228.54) (680.13) (201.20) (8.20) 
Catholic majority -3.05 -2.86 -7.87 -4.33 0.70 -6.67 -0.38 
 (9.21) (9.74) (8.04) (7.53) (7.69) (8.60) (0.33) 
Fragmented council -0.77 -2.36 4.10 0.00 -1.41 7.57 0.13 
 (10.98) (10.99) (7.37) (12.54) (12.63) (10.58) (0.50) 
Affiliated council 7.80 7.22 20.75** 9.00 5.20 8.23 0.18 
 (15.77) (16.11) (10.37) (13.39) (13.48) (13.37) (0.60) 
Constant 98.80*** 116.80*** 57.59*** 86.02*** 110.55*** 80.11*** 3.49*** 
 (24.91) (29.69) (15.21) (20.89) (21.44) (21.93) (0.93) 
Period 2000-2004 2000-2004 2000-2004 2000-2004 2000-2004 2000-2010 2000-2004 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Local government type fixed effects YES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Non-partisan governments included YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Counties included YES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 1,880 1,725 2,135 1,880 1,880 3,674 1,880 
Adj. R² 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.32 0.13 0.10 
Akaike 22,621.50 20,879.81 25,598.42 – 4,077.65 45,379.95 10,935.12 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the local government level in parentheses. Significance levels: *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 6: Placebo test: Long-term deficits (Euro per capita) 
 
Short-term deficit per capita Long-term deficit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Left-wing government (𝐿) -64.06*** -49.54*** 44.91 9.21 
 (20.52) (14.65) (27.51) (13.61) 
Co-partisanship (𝐶) -74.38*** -55.15*** 31.56 11.43 
 (19.44) (12.00) (21.20) (11.32) 
Left-wing government  Co-partisanship (𝐿 × 𝐶) 149.81*** 126.34*** -87.60*** -5.34 
 (42.81) (27.13) (32.05) (16.44) 
Period 2000–2004 2000–2010 2000–2004 2000–2010 
Further control variables YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Local government type fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Non-partisan governments included NO NO NO NO 
Counties included YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 1,880 4,038 1,880 4,038 
Adj. R² 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.03 
Akaike 22,621.50 50,263.97 23,690.37 52,321.00 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the local government level in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are taken from Ta-
ble 5 (Models 1 and 6). All estimations include a constant and the full set of control variables (see Table 5). Sig-
nificance levels: *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01. 
 
